Vern L. Peterson v. Browning, a Utah corporation, and David W. Rich : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1990
Vern L. Peterson v. Browning, a Utah corporation,
and David W. Rich : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David Bert Havas; Michelle E. Heward; David Bert Havas and Associates; Attorneys for Respondent.
William B. Bohling; Sharon E. Sonnenreich; Jones, Waldo, Holbrook and McDonough; Attorneys
for Petitioners.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Peterson v. Browning, No. 900401.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3171
£UMENT 
U 
>.§ 
0 
DCKf T NO. -
BRiEF 
' ~ IN THE WMSfEME COURT OF THE STAJTE OF UTAH 
mu^ 
VERN L. PETERSON, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
BROWNING, a Utah corporation, 
and DAVID W. RICH, 
Defendants/Petitioners. 
Supreme Court Docket 
Number 400401 
Priority 12 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Certification from the United Statds District Court 
in and for the District of Utah, Northern Division 
Case Number 87-NC-l^lG 
David Bert Havas, No. 1424 
Michelle E. Heward, No. 5084 
DAVID BERT HAVAS AND ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Respondent 
2604 Madison Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801)399-9636 
Williarii B. Bohling, No. 0373 
SharoniE. Sonnenreich, No. 4918 
JONES,J WALDO, HOLBROOK & 
MCDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
Salt Lkke City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
MAR 1 3 1991 
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VERN L. PETERSON, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
BROWNING, a Utah corporation, 
and DAVID W. RICH, 
Defendants/Petitioners. 
David Bert Havas, No. 1424 
Michelle E. Heward, No. 5084 
DAVID BERT HAVAS AND ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Respondent 
2604 Madison Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801)399-9636 
Supreme Court Docket 
Number 400401 
Priority 12 
William B. Bohling, No. 0373 
Sharon E. Sonnenreich, No. 4918 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & 
MCDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Certification from the United States District Court 
in and for the District of Utah, Northern Division 
Case Number 87-NC-121G 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. JURISDICTION 1 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
III. NON CASE LAW AUTHORITY 2 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
A. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 2 
B. FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE PRESENTED 
FOR REVIEW 4 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 13 
A. THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL 
DISCHARGE IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC 
POLICY SOUNDS IN TORT 13 
B. PLAINTIFF HAS SHOWN SUFFICIENT 
FACTS TO ESTABLISH A VIOLATION OF 
PUBLIC POLICY UNDER THE STANDARD 
SET FORTH IN BERUBE. 
C. ERISA DOES NOT PRE-EMPT PLAINTIFF'S 
PUBLIC POLICY CAUSE OF ACTION 13 
VI. ARGUMENT 13 
CONCLUSION 31 
ADDENDUM 33 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY Page 
Article 8 Section 3 of the Utah Constitution 1 
STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2(1) 1 
29 U.S.C. Section 1001 et seq 2 
CASES 
Alder v. American Standard Corp. 
538 F.Supp. 572 (1982) . . 7 26, 27 
Arnold v. Titan Services Co. 
783 P.2d 541 (1989) '. 7 14 
Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange 
701 P.2d 795 (Utah, 1985) 16 
Berube v. Fashion Center, Ltd. 
771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989) . . . . 3, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20, 28 
Boyle v. Vista Eyeware, Inc. 
700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. App. 1985) 17 
Harless v. First Nat'l Bank 
246 SE.2d 270 (W.Va. 1978) 27 
Howcroft v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. 
712 F.Supp. 1514 (D.Utah 1989) 18 
Ingersoll-Rand Company v. McClendon 
111 S.Ct. 478, 1990 US Lexis 6121, 112 L.Rd2d 474, 59 
U.S.L.W. 4033 (December 3, 1990) 29, 30, 31, 32 
Loose v. Nature-All Corp. 
785 P.2d 1096 14, 18 
Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co. 
779 P.2d 668 (Utah 1989) 18 
McNulty v. Borden, Inc. 
747 F.Supp. 1111 (E.D.Pa. 1979) 27 
Noye v. Hoffmann - La Roche, Inc. 
570 A.2d 12 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1990) 16, 17 
Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters 
344 P.2d 25 (1959) 19 
Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. 
84 N.J. 58, 72, 417 A.2d 505 (1980) 16 
Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc. 
116 Cal.App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981) 27 
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield 
610 P.2d 1330 (1980) 15, 19, 27 
Wagonseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital 
710 P.2d 1025 (1985) 15 
I. JURISDICTION 
This matter has been certified to this Court by the 
Honorable Judge Thomas Greene of the United States District Court 
for the District of Utah, Northern Division, pursuant to Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 41. The matter is within the 
jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Article 8 
Section 3 of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Annotated Section 
78-2-2(1) . 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Judge Greene has certified the following question to 
this Court for consideration: 
Does an action for termination of employment 
based upon the public exception to the 
employment-at-will doctrine for violation of 
or refusal to violate federal, other state, or 
Utah law, sound in tort or contract. 
Defendants have attempted to enlarge Judge Greene's 
certification issue and add their own issues for consideration. 
First, Defendants are essentially re-arguing a summary judgment 
motion previously rejected by Judge Greene, attempting to argue 
the facts before this Court. Judge Greene had specifically 
rejected Defendants attempts to include an extensive recitation of 
the facts in the Certification Order. He indicated that he could 
apply the law to the facts once enlightened with the law by this 
Court. To do otherwise would intrude upon the province of the 
federal court as the trier of fact. Nonetheless, and in light of 
the denial of Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendants' Brief, 
Plaintiff will address this issue below. 
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Second, Defendants assert that the certified issue is 
mooted by recent case law from the United States Supreme Court. 
That issue has been briefed and is awaiting oral argument before 
the federal trial court and Plaintiff again asserts that it would 
be improper for this Court to consider that issue as it is not 
certified and is solely within the province of the federal court 
to determine. 
III. NON-CASE LAW AUTHORITY 
In light of Defendants' contention regarding the 
mootness issue, portions of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. Section 1001 et seq., may 
require interpretation if the Court deems that is an appropriate 
issue for the Supreme Court to consider. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff was constructively discharged from his 
employment with Defendant Browning on October 31, 1984, after 
having worked for Browning since 1953. Verified Complaint, 
paragraphs 7, 11, a copy of which is attached1 as Addendum I. 
As a result of the termination, Plaintiff filed a 
lawsuit against Defendant Browning and Defendant Rich, alleging 1) 
a violation of ERISA by manipulation of the Browning Pension Plan 
PETERSON v. BROWNING and RICH 
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to coerce Plaintiff's early retirement as part of a scheme to 
terminate his employment; 2) a breach of an employment contract; 
and 3) termination of employment in violation of the public policy 
of the State of Utah. Verified Complaint attached. 
On December 21, 1988, Judge Greene ruled on Defendants' 
September 27, 1988, Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff's Non-Federal 
Claims. The Court ruled that Plaintiff's claims were not pre-
empted by ERISA, that the federal court had pendent jurisdiction, 
but dismissed the Third Cause of Action (public policy based 
claim) without prejudice. A copy of the Order Re Defendants' 
Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff's Non-Federal Claims is attached as 
Addendum II. 
Defendants then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment or, 
in the Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment on March 24, 1989, on 
the ERISA and contract causes of action. 
On March 24, 1989, Plaintiff filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration and for Reinstatement of Plaintiff's Third Cause 
of Action in light of this Court's decision in Berube v. Fashion 
Center, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989). Defendants responded and 
alternatively requested the summary judgment of Plaintiff's third 
cause of action. The Court ruled on August 16, 1989, (Order 
signed January 23, 1990) denying Defendants Motion for Summary 
Judgment or in the Alternative Partial Summary Judgment (Re ERISA 
and contractual causes of action), reinstating Plaintiff's public 
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policy based cause of action, and denying summary judgment of that 
cause of action as well. A copy of that order is attached as 
Addendum III. 
Defendants then moved for an interlocutory appeal to the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals which was denied on January 23, 
1990. A copy of that Memorandum Decision and Order is attached as 
Addendum IV. 
Defendants finally moved the U.S. District Court to 
certify issues to the Utah Supreme Court which motion was, 
obviously, granted on August 22, 1990. Defendants attempted at 
that time to enlarge the issues for certification, and to have 
this Court review the facts of the public policy based cause of 
action. The U.S. District Court agreed that was not appropriate 
and certified one fairly narrow issue for appeal, setting forth 
the facts that it determined appropriate and necessary for this 
Court to consider. A copy of the Certification Order is attached 
as Addendum V. 
B. FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. 
Plaintiff asserts that it is neither necessary nor 
appropriate for this Court to determine the issue that Defendants 
have articulated for review, i.e. whether Utah law would recognize 
the facts asserted by Plaintiff as sufficient for a finding of 
discharge in violation of public policy, as Utah law recognizes 
that doctrine. (Brief of Petitioners, p. 5). The issue that the 
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federal court articulated, i.e. whether the public policy 
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine sounds in tort or 
contract, requires only legal argument and not a recitation of 
facts outside of those set forth by the federal Court in its 
Certification Order. Defendants have thoroughly argued these 
facts in Summary Judgment Motions and Motions to Dismiss and the 
trial court has refused to dismiss the causes of action. 
Defendants are using this forum to again try to argue what they 
were unsuccessful at before, and improperly using the Supreme 
Court by taking the fact finding duty away from the federal court. 
The federal trial court is amply able to apply the law handed down 
from this Court to the particular facts of this case, and Judge 
Greene has stated such. 
In light of this Court's dismissal of Plaintiff's Motion 
to Strike Brief, however, Plaintiff will assert the following 
facts to respond to Defendants' factual issue determination. 
1. Plaintiff began his employment with Browning in 
1953. Plaintiff's Deposition, p. 18. 
2. In 1982, Plaintiff became general manager of 
Browning's facility in Arnold, Missouri and moved to Missouri. 
Plaintiff's Deposition, p. 20. 
3. Plaintiff objects to Defendants' characterization 
in paragraph 3 of its facts inasmuch as it suggests that 
Plaintiff's retirement from Browning was voluntary. Plaintiff did 
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leave Defendant Browning's employ on October 31, 1984. Plaintiff 
has consistently maintained from the inception of this lawsuit, 
however, that he was constructively discharged from his 
employment. Verified Complaint, paragraph 11. 
4. Plaintiff claims he was discharged because he 
opposed certain unlawful actions proposed by other officers and 
division managers of Defendant Browning and because he 
conscientiously carried out his duties as customs officer and as a 
corporate officer. Verified Complaint, paragraph 23. 
5. Plaintiff further claims that Browning's "discharge 
of [him] for exercising his duty of loyalty and care in the 
affairs of the corporation and for conscientiously performing his 
duties as Customs Officer as required by the law of Utah and the 
law of the United States violates the public policy of Utah and 
constitutes wrongful termination." Verified Complaint, paragraph 
24. 
6. Plaintiff disputes paragraphs 6 and 7 of 
Defendants' facts as they are taken out of context, are misleading 
or mischaracterize the facts. In response to a question regarding 
the basis of paragraph 23 of Plaintiff's Complaint (regarding his 
contention that he was constructively discharged because of his 
opposition to unlawful actions proposed by Browning officials and 
because he conscientiously carried out his duties as customs and 
corporate officer) Plaintiff indicated from page 181 to page 206 
PETERSON v. BROWNING and RICH Docket No. 400401 
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of his deposition that his opposition to falsification of customs 
documents regarding importation of firearms parts from Miroku 
Firearms of Japan; his opposition to falsification of inventory 
valuation for purposes of assessing the Merchants and 
Manufacturers Tax upon Defendant Browning's Arnold, Missouri plant 
inventory; his opposition to allow Berretta Firearms of Italy to 
use Browning's import permit to ship firearms into the United 
States; his refusal to short cut customs procedures in order to 
transfer Browning inventory from Montreal, Canada, to the United 
States; and his insistence on compliance with customs rules and 
regulations regarding the importation of golf clubs from Portugal, 
all contributed to the decision to force him out of his employment 
with Browning- Plaintiff's Deposition, pp. 162-64, 181-206. 
7. Plaintiff admits paragraph 8 of Defendants' facts, 
but refers the court to the preceding fact paragraph 6, and to the 
actual text of Plaintiff's deposition for a more complete 
explanation of the basis for his allegations in paragraph 23 of 
his Complaint. 
8. Plaintiff disputes Defendants' fact number 9 
inasmuch as it excludes David Rich. Plaintiff believes that Don 
Gobel, perhaps the Board of Directors, or anyone acting with 
authority from them would have authority to terminate Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff's Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, paragraph 
PETERSON v. BROWNING and RICH 
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34, attached hereto as Addendum VI. 
9. Plaintiff testified concerning the issue of the 
importation of the pistols from Japan that he had a conflict with 
another Browning officer over the issue and believed that officer 
desired him to ignore the instructions given to him by Mr. Gobel 
that Plaintiff was to abide by the letter and the spirit of 
customs laws. Peterson Deposition, p. 162-166, 191-192. 
10. Plaintiff disputes paragraph 11 of Defendants' 
facts as it is taken out of context, is misleading or 
mischaracterizes the facts. In response to an inquiry as to 
whether Mr. Peterson felt that he suffered any adverse 
repercussions because of his refusal to go along with Ray Allen, 
President of Browning Arms Corporation, regarding the illegal 
importation of pistols from Japan, the following testimony and 
questioning was given: 
"A. (Mr. Peterson) Yes, I feel very strongly I did. 
Q. (Mr. Money) What were those repercussions? 
A. Bad-mouthing Peterson for just another example of 
his unwillingness to cooperate." 
Peterson Deposition, p. 164. 
11. Plaintiff had a telephone conversation with Ray 
Allen, President of Browning Arms Corporation, wherein Plaintiff 
refused to cheat with regard to the importation of illegal pistol 
parts from Japan which resulted in Mr. Allen becoming extremely 
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angry with Plaintiff. Within a few days of this telephone 
conversation Plaintiff received a telephone call from Mr. Rich 
with regard to Plaintiff's retirement. These telephone 
conversations were recorded, transcribed and attached to 
Plaintiff's Affidavit in Support of his Memorandum in Opposition 
to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Peterson Deposition, 
p. 203. 
12. Plaintiff admits that he had a conflict with a 
Browning officer when Mr. Peterson, as Customs Officer, indicated 
that certain Berretta pistols could not be imported under a 
Browning license, as set forth in paragraph 12 of Defendants' 
facts, and asserts that it was Ray Allen, the President of 
Browning Arms, the same person with whom he had a conflict 
regarding the importation of pistols from Japan and not another 
Browning officer. 
13. Plaintiff admits that Mr. Gobel was a stickler for 
adherence to customs practices, but denies the characterization in 
paragraph 13 of Defendants' facts that this was Plaintiff's 
characterization of Mr. Gobel. A reading of the deposition 
reveals that Mr. Peterson merely agreed to this statement, it was 
not his description of Mr. Gobel. Plaintiff's Deposition, p. 192. 
14. Plaintiff disputes paragraph 14 of Defendants' 
facts inasmuch as it is taken out of context, is misleading or 
mischaracterizes the facts. Plaintiff did believe that his 
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insistence on strict adherence to customs practices played a part 
in the perception that he was uncooperative. In addition, 
however, Plaintiff stated that he thought that in Morgan there 
were people who felt whatever they gave Arnold was acceptable and 
that Arnold should go ahead and do it. As a result the reflection 
that came back to Arnold was that Arnold was extremely 
uncooperative in wanting to get the inventories transferred back 
and forth (in insisting that the customs laws be followed with 
regard to transporting inventories between the Montreal, Canada 
warehouse and Arnold). Plaintiff's Deposition, pp. 193-94. 
15. Plaintiff has no reason to disbelieve Mr. Gobel 
when he says that he was unaware of the Montreal situation. 
Plaintiff's Deposition, pp. 192-194. 
16. Plaintiff disputes paragraph 16 of Defendants' 
facts as it is taken out of context, is misleading or 
mischaracterizes the facts. What Mr. Peterson testified to in his 
deposition was that under a Generalized System of Preferences you 
can import a commodity from a country at less than the going rate 
of tariff if the State Department and the Treasury Department 
decide to honor the country with such treatment. Browning was 
attempting to get golf clubs made in Portugal to become qualified 
for that preferential treatment. Problems arose in Portugal and 
Don Gobel traveled to Portugal to, among other things, attempt to 
iron the problems out. He sent a memorandum to Plaintiff 
PETERSON v. BROWNING and RICH Docket No. 400401 
Brief of Respondent 
-11-
outlining the understanding which turned out to be wrong and more 
delays ensued. Plaintiff testified "Don's reaction to that 
[Plaintiff not going along with his memorandum] was not very 
happy. He did not tell me to cheat, but I knew he was not pleased 
that I didn't accept his memo and proceed accordingly." Plaintiff 
subsequently got the customs issue straightened out and Browning 
did accomplish the goal it wanted to accomplish. Plaintiff's 
Deposition, pp. 195-96. 
17. Plaintiff disputes paragraphs 17 and 18 of 
Defendants' facts as they are taken out of context, are misleading 
or mischaracterize the facts. With regard to paragraph 17, 
Plaintiff actually testified that there was a problem with regard 
to the Missouri Merchants and Manufacturers tax which is more 
fully set forth above at paragraph 6, in Plaintiff's deposition 
and also in Defendants' fact paragraph 18. Plaintiff testified 
that he could not think of any other information at the moment 
that would support his allegations contained in paragraph 23 of 
his Complaint, although he doubted further reflection would 
provide more information. Additional discovery, however, may 
provide Plaintiff with additional information to which he has not 
yet been made aware. 
18. Plaintiff disputes paragraph 19 of Defendants* 
facts as it is taken out of context, is misleading or 
mischaracterizes the facts. In addition to what is stated in fact 
PETERSON v. BROWNING and RICH 
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paragraph 19, Plaintiff further testified that he was having a 
meeting with Mr. Gobel on an unrelated subject when Don Jones, 
another Browning officer, came in indicating that there was a 
serious problem with the tax form that had just come in from the 
Arnold plant. The plant was at that time still under the 
management of Bob Clark who had been handling the tax forms up to 
that time. Mr. Jones indicated that if he put down the right 
figures on the tax form it would cost the company several hundred 
thousand dollars. That was the first indication Plaintiff had 
that there were problems with regard to the Missouri tax and 
inventory valuations for purposes of the tax forms at Arnold. 
Plaintiff's Deposition, pp. 182-84. 
19. Plaintiff discussed the problem of having 
inadequate information to accurately fill out the tax forms with 
Browning's counsel in Missouri. He was told to send the tax forms 
to Morgan to be filled out. Merchandise inventories were taken at 
Arnold, but by Morgan personnel, and the information was taken 
back to Morgan where the tax forms were filled out. Plaintiff 
believes that at least Don Jones wanted him to lie to the county 
officials about the amount of inventory that was subject to the 
tax. Mr. Jones indicated to Plaintiff that it was a pain in the 
neck for Morgan to do it and he didn't see why Arnold wouldn't go 
ahead and do it. Plaintiff's Deposition, pp. 182-88. 
20. Plaintiff agrees with paragraph 20 of Defendants' 
PETERSON v. BROWNING and RICH 
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facts, that Mr. Gobel asked Mr. Jones to look into the matter of 
under-evaluation of the merchants tax in Missouri and heard 
nothing further regarding the matter. Upon further inquiry, 
however, Mr. Gobel also testified that he never had another 
conversation with Mr. Jones concerning the problem, he gave no 
instructions as to what to do if the inventory was in fact under-
evaluated, he did not tell Mr. Jones that the inventory was not to 
continue to be under-evaluated, and he did not check into the 
facts to determine whether or not the inventory continued to be 
under-evaluated. Gobel's Deposition, pp. 132-33. 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS. 
A. THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL 
DISCHARGE IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 
SOUNDS IN TORT. 
B. PLAINTIFF HAS SHOWN SUFFICIENT FACTS TO 
ESTABLISH A VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 
UNDER THE STANDARD SET FORTH IN BERUBE. 
C. ERISA DOES NOT PRE-EMPT PLAINTIFF'S 
PUBLIC POLICY CAUSE OF ACTION. 
VI. ARGUMENT. 
A. THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL 
DISCHARGE IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 
SOUNDS IN TORT. 
Contrary to Defendants' arguments, Utah has clearly and 
expressly recognized a public policy exception to the employment-
at-will doctrine. In Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 
1033 (Utah, 1989), Justices Durham and Stewart clearly indicated 
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that they would adopt such a cause of action. Berube, at 1042. 
Justice Zimmerman's concurring opinion indicates he would likewise 
recognize the cause of action, Berube, at 1051, providing a 
majority of the Court on this issue. 
In post-Berube cases this Court has cited the two 
justice lead opinion as authority in those instances where Justice 
Zimmerman's concurring opinion agreed with the lead opinion. See, 
Arnold v. Titan Services Co., 783 P.2d 541, 544 (1989) (citing 
Berube as providing an implied and express contract exception to 
the at-will doctrine). If there was any question at all, this 
Court set the issue to rest in Loose v. Nature-All Corp., 785 P.2d 
1096 where the Court states: 
The post-Berube exceptions to the employment-
at-will doctrine in Utah include termination 
in violation of public policy. 
Loose at 1097. Public policy has been expressly recognized as an 
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. 
Having recognized a public policy based cause of action 
the more pressing issue is whether that cause of action sounds in 
tort or contract. The lead opinion in Berube refers to this 
exception as typically giving rise to an action in tort. A 
canvasing of the states on this issue shows that an overwhelming 
majority of states have recognized this cause of action as a tort. 
Of the thirty-nine (39) states that recognize a cause of action 
for violation of public policy in the employment setting, thirty-
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two (32) recognize the cause of action as a tort, only three (3) 
as a contract, and in four (4) states Plaintiff has not been able 
to ascertain the type of action provided. Appendix VII contains a 
complete state by state listing of the lead cases on this issue. 
There is strong reasoning behind the majority's position that the 
public policy cause of action is a tort. 
The Arizona Supreme Court in Wagonseller v. Scottsdale 
Memorial Hospital, 710 P.2d 1025, 1036 (1985) stated: 
Firing for bad cause - one against public 
policy articulated by constitutional, 
statutory or decisional law - is not a right 
inherent in the at-will contract, or in any 
other contract, even if expressly provided. 
See A. Corbin, Contracts Section 7; 6A a. 
Corbin, Contracts Sections 1373-75 (1962). 
Such a termination violates rights guaranteed 
to the employee by law and is tortious. See 
Prosser & Keeton on Torts Section 92 at 655 
(5th ed. 1984). 
The reasoning was similarly expressed by the California 
Supreme Court in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield, 610 P.2d 1330, 1334 
(1980), where it recognized that California decisions "have long 
recognized that a wrongful act committed in the course of a 
contractual relationship may afford both tort and contractual 
relief, and in such circumstances the existence of the contractual 
relationship will not bar the injured party from pursuing redress 
in tort. The contract itself may give rise to duties that, if 
broken, would be remedied as a tort. 
Protecting the substantial and important public policy 
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of the state requires the type of protection that a tort claim, 
with its potentially punitive measures, can provide. If left to 
contractual damages alone, employers may choose to take their 
chances and pay the damages if caught because the deterrent effect 
will simply not be present. 
Defendants cite to Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 
701 P.2d 795 (Utah, 1985) in support of their argument that any 
public policy based claim should sound in contract. Beck., 
however, is distinguishable in that it involved a breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, not a termination that 
violated public policy as in the case at bar. 
In Noye v. Hoffmann - La Roche, Inc., 570 A.2d 12 (N.J. 
Super. A.D. 1990) that court discussed the differences between 
their public policy based cause of action (a tort) and a cause of 
action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
(a contract). Referring to New Jersey's lead case for wrongful 
dismissal in violation of public policy, the Court analyzed: 
'Although a cause of action lay in contract 
the employee had a right to maintain an action 
in tort "based on the duty of [the] employer 
not to discharge an employee who refused to 
perform an act that is a violation of a clear 
mandate of public policy.f Pierce v. Ortho 
Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 72, 417 A.2d 
505 (1980). It was not the breach of contract 
with the employee that gave rise to the tort 
but the underlying motivation of the employer 
which involved antisocial conduct detrimental 
to society in general. The tort lay not in 
the breach of contract but in the violation of 
valuable social norms - denominated by the 
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Court as clear mandates of public policy. 
Noye, 570 A.2d at 14. 
Defendants further argue that it is inherently 
inequitable for the law to impose a burden that can be enforceable 
by the imposition of punitive damages in the absence of 
independently tortious conduct. The Missouri Court of Appeals 
responded to this argument eloquently: 
The public policy exception is narrow enough 
in its scope and application to be no threat 
to employers who operate within the mandates 
of the law and clearly established public 
policy as set out in the duly adopted laws. 
Such employers will never be troubled by the 
public policy exception because their 
operations and practices will not violate 
public policy. 
Accordingly, where an employer has discharged 
an at-will employee because that employee 
refused to violate the law or any well 
established and clear mandate of public policy 
as expressed in the constitution, statutes and 
regulations promulgated pursuant to statute, 
or because the employer reported to his 
superiors or to public authorities serious 
misconduct that constitutes violations of the 
law and of such well established and clearly 
mandated public policy, the employee has a 
cause of action in tort for damages for 
wrongful discharge. 
Boyle v. Vista Eyeware, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. App. 1985). 
Defendant Browning or any other employer who 
conscientiously conducts its relationships with its employees will 
have no need for concern in being caught off guard by the 
recognition of a public policy based cause of action. 
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Defendants cite Judge Anderson's decision in Howcroft v. 
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 712 F.Supp. 1514 
(D.Utah 1989) as somehow being determinative of the issue at bar. 
Judge Greene, after considering Howcroft and hearing argument, on 
this very point, concluded that "Howcroft..., cited by the 
Defendants is not inapposite. The public policy exception 
recognized in Berube was not at issue in Howcroft and Judge 
Anderson did not rule upon or even discuss it. (Memorandum 
Decision & Order, January 23, 1990, see Appendix) Defendants, 
however, inappropriately continue to use Howcroft as authority for 
the public policy issue. 
Defendants' reliance on Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., 
779 P.2d 668 (Utah 1989) is likewise misplaced. As has been 
argued above, Berube and Loose clearly indicate the adoption of 
the public policy based cause of action in the employment arena. 
Lowe is not on point and makes no clear statements as were made in 
Berube and Loose. 
This Court has clearly held that the termination of an 
employment relationship for a reason that violates substantial and 
important public policy is actionable in our state. The 
overwhelming majority of the states have found that such a cause 
of action sounds in tort, in order to provide sufficient 
protection of the "substantial and important" rights involved. No 
precedent of this state would require a different result. 
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B. PLAINTIFF HAS SHOWN SUFFICIENT FACTS TO 
ESTABLISH A VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 
UNDER THE STANDARD SET FORTH IN BERUBE. 
Plaintiff again protests to being required to respond to 
an issue that Defendants are placing before the Court. The 
argument that Defendants assert, and that of Plaintiff hereafter, 
are substantially the same as were presented to and ruled upon by 
Judge Greene in response to Defendants1 Motion for Summary 
Judgment on this public policy cause of action. Defendants are 
here simply trying to take this case from the trial court, where 
their motion was unsuccessful. That notwithstanding, Plaintiff 
presents the following argument. 
Defendants would have the Court shut its eyes to 
Defendant Browning's illegal conduct and the ultimate effect that 
Plaintiff's refusal to engage in such activity had on his 
employment. Defendants first argue that the lead opinion in 
Berube would find a public policy violation only in statute or 
judicial opinion and that Plaintiff has failed to articulate such 
a violation which led to Plaintiff's termination. The examples of 
public policy given in the lead opinion strongly support 
Plaintiff's cause of action. The violations Plaintiff complains 
of are analogous of those found in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield, 
610 P.2d 1330 (1980) (cause of action for employee terminated for 
refusing to engage in an illegal price fixing scheme) and 
Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 
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(1959) (cause of action for employee terminated for refusing to 
commit perjury) cases cited in the Berube lead opinion. 
Plaintiff's allegations are not like those superficial and 
transitory public policies which Berube would not recognize, i.e., 
public policy to provide and promote job security and full 
employment for its citizens. Berube at 1043. Plaintiff has 
maintained from the beginning that he was terminated for refusing 
to engage in or condone illegal activity. 
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has never claimed he was 
fired because he refused to violate any law. This is directly at 
odds with Defendants' own fact paragraphs 4 and 5 which state that 
Plaintiff indeed alleged in his Complaint that he was 
constructively discharged for opposing unlawful actions for 
conscientiously carrying out his duties as a customs and corporate 
officer as required by the law of Utah and the law of the United 
States. Plaintiff's Complaint, Third Cause of Action, paragraphs 
23 and 24. Certainly this is adequate notice under our notice 
pleading rules. 
Defendants then had an opportunity to question Plaintiff 
at his deposition regarding the basis of these allegations. 
Plaintiff indicated that the allegations were based upon 
Plaintiff's opposition to the falsification of customs documents 
regarding the importation of firearm parts from Miroku Firearms of 
Japan, his opposition to the falsification of inventory valuation 
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for purposes of assessing the Merchant's and Manufacturer's Tax 
upon the Arnold, Missouri plant inventory, his opposition to allow 
Berretta Firearms of Italy to use Browning's import permit to ship 
firearms into the United States, his refusal to short cut customs 
procedures in order to transfer Browning inventory from Montreal, 
Canada to the United States, and his insistence on compliance with 
customs rules and regulations regarding the importation of golf 
clubs from Portugal. Plaintiff went into each instance in some 
detail, indicating the anger that was directed at him for not 
going along with the illegal practices, and the extra work and 
measures that others at Browning had to do in order to get around 
Plaintiff's refusals to condone or participate in the illegal 
conduct. 
Plaintiff testified that in late 1983, he received a 
telephone call from Ray Allen, the president of Browning Arms, 
that Italian representatives of Berretta wanted to use Browning's 
import permit to ship a considerable number of Berretta pistols to 
Pennsylvania. When Plaintiff told Mr. Allen they could not do it 
because it was illegal, Mr. Allen got extremely angry. Plaintiff 
suggested some legal measures to get the shipment imported, 
although that was apparently not satisfactory to Mr. Allen who 
hung up on Plaintiff. Some time later Plaintiff received a 
pleading call from an Italian representative again to use 
Browning's permit. Plaintiff again refused the angered 
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representative. Finally, Don Gobel contacted Plaintiff asking 
what the problem was with regard to importing the shipment. Mr. 
Gobel was not pleased, but Plaintiff believes he understood the 
reason for Plaintiff's decision. Peterson Deposition, pp. 188-92. 
Plaintiff apparently further irritated Browning 
officials regarding the closing of the Browning plant in Montreal, 
Canada. The transfer of the inventories from Canada to the 
Arnold, Missouri plant required compliance with customs laws. 
Morgan personnel became irritated and upset with Plaintiff because 
of his insistence on strict compliance with customs procedures due 
to the increased time involved in doing so. Plaintiff did not 
agree with all directives regarding the transfers which came from 
Morgan and was therefore viewed as being extremely uncooperative, 
less than a team player. Plaintiff's Deposition, pp. 191-94. 
There was another customs problem that arose regarding 
the importation of golf clubs from Portugal. Mr. Peterson 
testified that under a Generalized System of Preferences a company 
can import a commodity from a country at less than the going rate 
of tariff if the State Department and the Treasury Department 
decide to honor the country with such treatment. Browning was 
attempting to get golf clubs made in Portugal to become qualified 
for that preferential treatment. Problems arose in Portugal and 
Don Gobel traveled to Portugal to, among other things, attempt to 
iron the problems out. He sent a memorandum to Plaintiff 
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outlining the understanding which turned out to be wrong and more 
delays ensued. Plaintiff testified "Don's reaction to that [not 
going along with his memorandum] was not very happy. He did not 
tell me to cheat, but I knew he was not pleased that I didn't 
accept his memo and proceed accordingly." Plaintiff subsequently 
got the customs issue straightened out and Browning did accomplish 
the goal it wanted to accomplish. Plaintiff's Deposition, pp. 
195-96. 
Plaintiff again met with opposition when he refused to 
falsify Jefferson County, Missouri tax documents. Plaintiff 
testified that he was having a meeting with Don Gobel on an 
unrelated subject when Don Jones, Browning's Treasurer, came in 
indicating that there was a serious problem with the tax form that 
had just come in from the Arnold plant. The plant was at that 
time still under the management of Bob Clark who had been handling 
the tax forms. Mr. Jones indicated that if he put down the right 
figures on the tax form it would cost the company several hundred 
thousand dollars. That was the first indication Plaintiff had 
that there were problems with regard to the Missouri tax and 
inventory valuations for purposes of the tax forms at Arnold. 
Plaintiff was sent to run the Arnold, Missouri plant 
shortly thereafter and discussed the problem with Browning's 
counsel in Missouri. Plaintiff was told to send the tax forms to 
Morgan to be filled out. Merchandise inventories were taken at 
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Arnold, but by Morgan personnel, and the information was taken 
back to Morgan. Plaintiff stated that he believes that at least 
Don Jones wanted him to lie to the county officials about the 
amount of inventory that was subject to the tax. Mr. Jones 
indicated to Plaintiff that it was a pain in the neck for Morgan 
to do it and he didn't see why Arnold wouldn't go ahead and do it. 
Plaintiff's Deposition, pp. 182-88. 
Finally, Plaintiff testified that he and Ray Allen, 
President of Browning Arms Company, had gotten into an angry 
confrontation over the importation of pistol parts from Miroku, a 
Japanese corporation. Plaintiff objected to a Miroku shipment 
manifest of pistol parts because Browning did not have an import 
license for pistol parts from Japan. Plaintiff's Deposition, p. 
162. In fact it was illegal to import pistol parts from Japan. 
Gobel Deposition, p. 65-66. Ray Allen was responsible for the 
shipment and a shouting match ensued when Plaintiff confronted Mr. 
Allen and refused to change the shipping documents to incorrectly 
reflect rifle parts which Browning could lawfully import from 
Miroku. This incident took place just days before Plaintiff began 
receiving telephone calls from Dave Rich which ultimately led to 
his forced resignation by the end of that month. Plaintiff's 
Deposition, pp. 162-63. 
Plaintiff has given Defendants ample notice of the above 
conduct which is illegal and which he believes ultimately led to 
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his termination from Browning. The conduct which Plaintiff 
refused to condone or engage in was illegal and Plaintiff should 
not be wrongfully terminated because of his refusal to go along 
with the illegal conduct. A more clear public policy violation is 
difficult to imagine. Defendants have failed and refused to 
provide Plaintiff with requested information regarding illegal 
customs practices and falsifying tax forms, yet Defendants attempt 
to argue that Plaintiff does not have sufficient facts to prove 
his allegations. This type of hide and seek game is clearly 
inappropriate and should not be tolerated. 
Defendants next argue that since Don Gobel did not 
personally ask Plaintiff to violate any laws, and since Mr. Gobel 
and the Board of Directors were the only ones who could ultimately 
fire Plaintiff, Plaintiff cannot state a claim for relief. 
Defendant Browning must, of course, act through its agents and is 
ultimately responsible for the actions of those agents. 
Plaintiff believes that there was animosity toward him and that 
the animosity was what led Mr. Gobel and Mr. Rich into forcing him 
out of his employment. Plaintiff believes that the basis of this 
animosity, however, was Plaintiff's refusal to condone and engage 
in the illegal activities of other Browning officers which conduct 
is more fully set forth above. Plaintiff had been a thorn in the 
side of various Browning officers who wanted to short cut customs 
and tax laws over the years. As custom's officer he refused to 
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allow the illegal importation of pistol parts from Japan and golf 
clubs from Portugal, and to allow Browning's importation license 
to be used by Berretta of Italy. Plaintiff's refusals led to 
angry confrontations with Browning officials. Plaintiff further 
required additional work from Defendant Browning's Morgan 
personnel who were delayed in clearing the Montreal warehouse 
because of Plaintiff's insistence on complying with customs laws. 
Morgan personnel were also required to take merchandise 
inventories of the Arnold plant after Plaintiff took over as 
manager and to prepare the tax forms on the merchandise. This was 
previously done in Arnold under its prior management. A clear 
inference that Plaintiff's refusals precipitated the termination 
can be found in the timing of Plaintiff's last refusal to violate 
customs laws. It was only a few days after Plaintiff's angry 
confrontation with Browning Arms Company President Ray Allen, over 
the Miroku pistol importation, that Dave Rich called regarding 
termination/retirement. A logical inference can be made and 
should be left to the trier of fact to determine whether the 
animosity which led to Plaintiff's termination was as a result of 
Plaintiff's failure to "play ball" with other managers who were 
engaging in illegal activity. 
It is untenable to argue that the State of Utah has no 
interest in upholding the principles of federal or other state 
law. When confronted with this issue in Alder v. American 
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Court of Maryland analyzed: 
This Court cannot agree that the State of 
Maryland should close its eyes and, as a 
matter of policy, not be concerned with 
violations of federal law. 
Various courts have recognized that federal 
public policy may properly form the basis for 
an abusive discharge suit in a state contract. 
See McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 747 F.Supp. 1111 
(E.D.Pa. 1979); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield 
Co., 27 Cal.3d 167, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 610 
P.2d 1330 (1980); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 
246 SE.2d 270 (W.Va. 1978); See also Pugh v. 
See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal.App. 3d 311, 171 
Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981). No cases have been 
cited to the Court holding to the contrary. 
Utah citizens who are terminated from their employment 
because they refuse to engage in illegal activities, should be 
protected regardless of whether the law governing them arose from 
federal, state or other state statutes or regulations. The effect 
on the party of having to choose between keeping their job or 
following law that governs them, is the same regardless of where 
the law originates from, and the public policy of the State of 
Utah should not protect such conduct by an employer against its 
employee. 
Judge Greene in his Memorandum Decision and Order, 
Addendum IV, ftnt. 1, indicates what he interprets the public 
policy exception to consist of: "This exception protects an at-
will employee from being discharged for a reason or in a manner 
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that contravenes sound principles of established and public 
policy." In Berube this Court indicated that public policy is 
most obviously, but not exclusively embodied in legislative 
enactments. Berube, 771 P.2d at 1043. The facts of Plaintiff's 
public policy based cause of action therefore, give rise to one of 
the clearest public policy based claims. Judge Greene, in ruling 
from the bench on the motions for reinstatement and summary 
judgments, agreed: 
THE COURT: All right. On the motion for 
reinstatement, I'm going to grant that motion. 
The third cause of action, I think we are 
driven by a lot of facts here. I'm satisfied 
that there is a direction in Utah law which 
would embrace, at least, this kind of a public 
policy. So Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment on the third cause of action is 
denied. 
Transcript of August 16, 1989, bench ruling, p.3 (emphasis 
supplied). See attached Addendum VIII. There clearly are 
sufficient facts to support the cause of action. 
C. ERISA DOES NOT PRE-EMPT PLAINTIFF'S 
PUBLIC POLICY CAUSE OF ACTION. 
Again, Defendants are improperly submitting issues for 
consideration of this Court that are more appropriately left to 
the trial Court. In fact, Defendants have briefed this issue 
before the federal trial court and it is awaiting oral argument 
there. In light of the denial of Plaintiff's Motion to Strike 
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Defendants' Brief, however, Plaintiff will briefly respond to 
Defendants' arguments. 
Plaintiff has successfully defended a Motion to Dismiss 
and Summary Judgment Motion on this very issue before the trial 
Court. The only new authority cited is Ingersoll-Rand Company v. 
McClendon, 111 S.Ct. 478, 1990 US Lexis 6121, 112 L.Rd2d 474, 59 
U.S.L.W. 4033 (December 3, 1990). Ingersoll does not break new 
ground. The issue is still the same as it was before Ingersoll 
(and when previously decided by the federal trial court): Do 
Plaintiff's state law causes of action "relate to" the employee 
benefit plan sufficiently to require pre-emption by ERISA. The 
answer is also still the same: No. 
In Ingersoll-Rand the Court had to determine whether a 
state law claim for wrongful termination "related to" an ERISA 
violation. The Texas court had held that under state law "a 
plaintiff could recover in a wrongful discharge action if he 
established that 'the principal reason for his termination was the 
employer's desire to avoid contributing to or paying benefits 
under the employee's pension fund.'" Ingersoll-Rand, 59 U.S.L.W. 
at 4034. Not surprisingly, the United State Supreme Court found 
that "the existence of a pension plan is a critical factor in 
establishing liability under the State's wrongful discharge law. 
As a result, this cause of action relates not merely to pension 
benefits, but to the essence of the pension plan itself." Id. at 
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4035. The Court goes on to say that "The Texas cause of action 
makes specific reference to, and indeed is premised on, the 
existence of a pension plan." I£. That is clearly not the case 
at bar. 
In the Texas case, "there simply is n£ cause of action 
if there is no plan." I£. In the case at bar, both state law 
causes of action can stand without the existence of a pension 
plan. Plaintiff's second cause of action basically alleges that 
Defendant discharged Plaintiff without notice of dissatisfaction, 
without opportunity to respond, without investigation of 
criticism, without notice of performance deficiencies and an 
opportunity to improve, all in breach of covenants of the 
employment contract. The third cause of action basically alleges 
that Plaintiff was discharged because he opposed unlawful actions 
proposed by Browning officials and because he conscientiously 
carried out his duties as customs officer and corporate officer. 
Neither state law causes of action rely upon the existence of a 
pension plan. 
Defendants argue that the allegations supporting the 
second and third causes of action intermesh with the ERISA cause 
of action. Supposedly in support of that proposition they cite to 
paragraphs 14 and 15 of Plaintiff's Complaint. Both of these 
paragraphs, however, are contained in the First Cause of Action, 
refer to the ERISA violation, and have nothing to do with the 
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second and third causes of action. If the Court followed the 
Defendants' argument to its logical conclusion, an employer could 
always protect itself from wrongful termination actions by simply 
maintaining a pension plan for the employer. ERISA does not 
attempt to pre-empt the entire range of cases, but only those 
where there is a logical "relation to" or dependence on the plan 
to support the cause of action. 
Not only is the Ingersoll-Rand decision distinguishable 
as is set forth above, but it does not break new ground in the 
pre-emption area. It merely reiterates the prior case law which 
was before the federal court when it previously ruled on this 
issue denying Defendants the relief they request this Court grant 
them. 
CONCLUSION 
There is only one issue that is appropriately before 
this Court: that certified by the Federal District Court. Utah 
should follow the overwhelming majority of states and determine 
that the cause of action for wrongful termination from employment 
in violation of public policy sounds in tort. 
It would invade the province of the trial court for this 
Court to apply the law to the facts
 tof this case. Once 
enlightened as to the status of the state law, the Federal Court 
can apply the law to the facts. The Federal Court should likewise 
be allowed to rule on the ERISA issue and determine the effect, if 
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any, of the Ingersoll-Rand case on the case at bar. That issue 
was not certified, does not and should not be addressed by the 
Supreme Court. In any event, Plaintiff concludes that there are 
sufficient facts to support the action, and that the Ingersoll 
case is distinguishable from this case and has no application 
whatsoever. 
DATED this /3 day of March, 1991. 
/<>/ hi 
DAVID BERT HAVAS of MICHELLE E. HEWARD of 
DAVID BERT HAVAS AND ASSOC. DAVID BERT HAVAS AND ASSOC. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered four 
true and correct copies of the above and foregoing Brief of 
Respondent to William B. Bohling and Sharon E. Sonnenreich of 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, Attorneys for Defendants, 1500 
First Interstate Plaza, 170 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111, on this ) 3 day of March, 1991. 
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ADDENDUM INDEX 
I. Verified Complaint, dated 10/30/87; 
II. Order Re Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Non-
Federal Claims, dated 12/21/88; 
III. Order Re Reinstatement of Third Cause of Action, Summary 
Judgement Motions, denials and other orders, dated 
1/23/90; 
IV. Memorandum Decision and Order, dated 1/23/90; 
V. Certification Order, dated 8/22/90; 
VI. Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
dated 4/26/89, except for attached transcriptions; 
VII. State by state case law of lead cases on public policy 
issue; and 
VIII. Bench Ruling, 8/16/89. 
Elizabeth T. Dunninq 
WA^KISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2171 
Telephone: (801) 363-3300 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
NORTHERN DIVISION 
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VEPN L. PETERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BROWNING, a Utah 
corporation, and 
DAVID W. RICH, 
Defendants, 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 87-NC^121G 
Jury Trial Demanded 
Vern L. Peterson alleqes as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. Vern L. Peterson ("Peterson") is a resident of 
South Oaden, Utah. 
2. Brownina is a corporation organized under the 
laws of the State of Utah and having its principal place of 
business in Moraan, Utah. 
3. David W. Rich is a resident of Weber County, Uta 
and at all times material to this Complaint was the Personnel 
Director of defendant Brownina and a member of the Committee 
which is the Plan Administrator of the Employees1 Pension Plar 
of Browning and other Adopting Companies ("Browning Pension 
Plan"). 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
4. This Court has jurisdiction of this action pur-
suant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 
§1132, and the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. 
5. This Court has pendent jurisdiction over plain-
tiff's state law claims because the state and federal claims 
set forth arise from a common nucleus of operative facts. 
6. Venue is proper in this Court because the breaches 
occurred in this district and the defendants are found in this 
district. 
FACTS 
7. In 1953 plaintiff Peterson began employment with 
Browning as a sales correspondent. 
8. For the next 31 years Peterson continued to work 
for Browning and received numerous promotions. In 1981 Peterson 
was promoted to Vice President of Browning and was appointed 
Customs Officer and Corporate Secretary of Browning. 
9. In August 1982 Peterson was transferred to the 
Arnold, Missouri facility of Browning as general manager. Prior 
to Peterson's transfer Browning agreed that it would continue 
to employ Peterson as general manager of the Arnold facility 
for six years until he reached age 60 and would pay the cost 
of Peterson's relocation to Missouri and back to Utah. 
10. At all times during his employment Peterson's 
performance was satisfactory. During the time he was a vice 
president, he exercised the duties of loyalty and care in the 
conduct of the affairs of Browning required of a corporate of 
During the time he was Customs Officer, Peterson fulfilled th 
duties of that position with diligence and care. 
11. On October 31, 1984, Peterson was constructive 
discharged from his employment by Browning. 
y — 
_l I « FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
d | i 5 12. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 11 at 
2
 t * z f{ < o 2 13 • Defendant Rich failed to discharge his duties 
w tn m 3 
^ z fi t with respect to the Browning Pension Plan solely in the inter 
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- H S J ^st of participants and beneficiaries and instead manipulated 
the Plan to coerce Peterson's early retirement as part of a 
scheme to terminate Peterson's employment. 
14. Defendant Rich's conduct in using the Browning 
Pension Plan as part of a scheme to terminate Peterson's empl 
ment in violation of defendant Browning's contract with Peter 
and the public policy of th? State of Utah constitutes a brea 
of defendant Rich's fiduciary duty as a member of the Committ 
which is the Plan Administrator of the Browning Pension Plan 
and a violation of the Employee Retirement Security Act, 29 
U.S.C. §1001, et seq. (ERISA). 
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15, Defendant Browning's knowing participation in 
defendant Rich's breach of fiduciary duty as part of its scheme 
to terminate Petersonfs employment in violation of its contract 
with Peterson and the public policy of the State of Utah consti-
tutes a violation of ERISA. 
16. As a result of defendants' conduct as aforesaid, 
Peterson has lost salary, bonuses and fringe benefits, including 
contributions to his Browning Pension Plan account. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
-^ * !i 17. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 16 above. 
? * l< ? 
£ < x ® 18. Defendant Browning's constructive discharge of 
i *" 5 < 
) * % 5 plaintiff on October 31, 1984, constituted a breach of its six-ye< 
y 2 >•* 
6 w 2 £ 
£ n. 5 employment contract with Peterson. 
J < £ < 19. Defendant Browning's constructive discharge of 
; i < Peterson after 31 years of loyal and satisfactory service without 
any notice of dissatisfaction with his performance, without 
any opportunity for him to respond to criticism and without 
any investigation of the criticisms breached defendant Browning's 
duty of good faith and fair dealing in its contract of employ-
ment with Peterson. 
20. Defendant Browning's constructive discharge of 
Peterson without notice of performance deficiencies and an oppor-
tunity to improve violated Browning's policy and practice of 
giving employees oral and written warnings and an opportunity 
to improve prior to termination and constituted a breach of 
its contract of employment with Peterson. 
21. As a result of Browning's breaches as set fort] 
above, Peterson has lost salary, bonuses and fringe benefits, 
including contributions to his Browning Pension Plan account. 
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
22. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 21 abc 
23. Peterson was constructively discharged because 
he opposed certain unlawful actions proposed by other officers 
and division managers of defendant Browning and because he cor 
j entiously carried out his duties as Customs Officer and as a 
• corporate officer. 
D 24. Defendant Browning's constructive discharge of 
o Peterson for exercising his duty of loyalty and care in the 
< affairs of the corporation and for conscientiously performing 
< his duties as Customs Officer as required by the law of Utah 
and the law of the United States violates the public policy 
of Utah and constitutes wrongful termination. 
25. Defendant Browning's wrongful termination of 
Peterson has caused Peterson to lose salary, bonuses and fring 
benefits, including contributions to his Browning Pension Plan 
account, and to suffer mental anguish, embarrassment and humil 
tion. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays as follows: 
1. On his first claim for relief, for lost salary, 
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bonuses and frinae benefits, including contributions to his 
Browninq Pension Plan account, with interest; for punitive damage 
and for attorneys fees; 
2. On his second claim for relief, for lost salary, 
bonuses and fringe benefits, including contributions to his 
Browninq Pension Plan account, with interest; 
3. On his third claim for relief, for lost salary, 
bonuses and frinqe benefits, including contributions to his 
Brownina Pension Plan account, with interest; for general damages 
in an amount to be determined at trial and for punitive damages 
in an amount not less than $500,000; 
4. And for costs and for such other relief as the 
Court deems proper. 
DATED this day of October, 1987. 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
By. £/o*6«M .Q, ,"-*• r Elizabeth T. Dunninq 310 South Main Street 
Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-21 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Plaintiff's Address: 
813 E. 5750 S. 
Pouth Oqden, Utah 8 4 405 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
VERN L. PETERSON, being duly sworn, deposes and sta 
that he resides at 813 E. 5750 S.f South Ogden, Utah 84405; 
that he is the plaintiff named in the foregoing complaint; an 
that he has read the foregoing complaint and that the allega-
tions therein are true and correct to the best of his knowled 
« r Information and belief, 
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Sharon E. Sonnenr^^ttT{lisB7iT5l8) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Defendants 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, NORTHERN DIVISION 
VERN L. PETERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BROWNING, a Utah corporation, 
and DAVID W. RICH, an 
individual. 
Defendants. 
ORDER RE DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS 
TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S 
NON-FEDERAL CLAIMS 
Civil No. 87-NC-121G 
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff's Non-Federal 
Claims were heard before the Honorable J. Thomas Greene, United 
States District Court Judge, on December 5, 1988. Plaintiff 
was represented by David Bert Havas and Michelle E. Heward of 
David Bert Havas & Associates. Defendants were represented by 
David R. Money and Sharon E. Sonnenreich of Jones, Waldo, 
Holbrook & McDonough. 
The court, having considered the arguments of counsel, 
finds the following: 
* -3 J — -. J 
5T 
1. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss plaintiffs state 
law claims on the basis that they are pre-empted by the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001, et 
seg. is denied; 
2. Defendants' Motion pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) to dismiss plaintiffs state law 
claims on the basis that this court lacks pendent jurisdiction 
is denied; and 
3. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss plaintiffs Third 
Cause of Action (Wrongful Discharge) pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is hereby granted and plaintiffs 
Third Cause of Action is dismissed without prejudice. 
DATED this day of December, 1988. 
Copies mailed to counsel, 12-27-88jm gy THE COURT: 
David fi. Havas, Esq. 
David R. Money, Esq. 
^ t < ^ A ^ 
Thomas Greene 
United States District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
David Bert Havas 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE DISTRICT OF UTAH - NORTHERN DIVISION 
VERN L. PETERSON, 
Plaintiff, Civil No. 87-NC-121G 
v. ORDER 
BROWNING, a Utah Corporation, 
and DAVID W. RICH, 
Defendants. 
The above matter came on regularly for hearing on 
August 16, 1989, upon numerous motions made by both parties. 
Plaintiff was represented by David Bert Havas and Michelle E. 
Heward. Defendants were represented by David R. Money and Sharon 
E. Sonnenreich. The court heard the oral arguments of counsel 
and examined extensive briefs from the parties, and now being 
fully advised makes, it is hereby 
ORDERED: 
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and 
Reinstatement of the Third Cause of Action is granted. 
FURTHER ORDERED: 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Third 
Cause of Action is denied. Dispute concerning material facts 
precludes summary judgment. 
FURTHER ORDERED: 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment or in the 
Alternative Partial Summary Judgment as to the First and Second 
Causes of Action is denied. Discovery concerning material issues 
of fact in dispute should be conducted, including ambiguity as to 
the meaning of "six years" in the contract sued upon. 
FURTHER ORDERED: 
Defendants1 Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Motion to 
Compel is granted without prejudice to the bringing of further 
motions to compel and/or motions for protective orders as may be 
deemed necessary, after the parties have attempted to work out 
their disagreements. In this regard, the court directs counsel 
to meet together and do the following: 
- Listen to the original tapes made of the 
telephone conversations prior to plaintiff's termination in order 
to determine and agree upon a fair and accurate transcript of 
said recordings• 
- Try to agree upon an appropriate arrangement for 
production of documents and disclosure of bonus calculations and 
income information which shall include dollar amounts as well as 
percentages. However, identities of the individuals receiving 
such bonuses and income need not be disclosed. If defense 
counsel believes that the information requested or documents 
involved are privileged, and an arrangement for masking out 
2 
certain portions cannot be agreed upon, a privilege log 
identifying the matters and items claimed to be privileged shall 
be filed with the court and served upon counsel. 
- Determine whether counsel can agree upon what 
additional information and documents should be provided in light 
of reinstatement of plaintiff's Third Cause of Action. 
FURTHER ORDERED: 
Defendant's Motion for Protective Order Regarding 
Customs and Tax Laws is denied. 
FURTHER ORDERED: 
Defendants1 Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Designation of 
Expert Witness is denied. Defendants may depose the witness 
beyond the existing discovery cut off date. 
FURTHER ORDERED: 
The court reserves ruling on the Motions in Limine. 
FURTHER ORDERED: 
An Amended Scheduling Order shall be prepared by 
counsel for defendants which shall provide for discovery with 
regard to the Third Cause of Action as well as such further 
discovery as may be agreed upon by the parties. The Amended 
Scheduling Order shall be lodged with the court after compliance 
with local Rule 13(e). 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: January 
t 
J// THOMAS GREENE 
ITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
COPIES TO; l/24/90rrp: 
David Havas, Esq. 
David Money, Esq. 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT. COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH - NORTHERN DIVISION 
VERN L. PETERSON, 
Plaintiff, Civil No. 87-NC-121G 
V. MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
BROWNING, a Utah Corporation, 
and DAVID W. RICH, 
Defendants. 
The above matter came on regularly for hearing on 
December 7, 1989 on Defendants1 Motion for Certification for 
Interlocutory Appeal and Stay. David Bert Havas and Michelle E. 
Heward represented plaintiff, and Sharon Sonnenreich represented 
defendants. The court heard oral arguments and reviewed 
extensive briefs. Being fully advised, the court now enters its 
Memorandum Decision and Order. 
The Court denies defendants1 Motion for Certification 
to the Tenth Circuit. 
The issue before the Court is driven by Utah law. It 
is clear to this court that the Utah Supreme Court recognizes a 
public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine. 
Berube v. Fashion Center, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989) ;2 Loos 
v. Nature-All Corporation, 1989 Utah Lexis 146 (Utah Nov. 27, 
1989) . The majority in Loose said: "The post Berube exceptions 
to the employment at will doctrine in Utah include termination 
violation of public policy, . . . " Howcroft v. Mountain States 
Telephone & Telegraph Co.. 712 F,Supp. 1514 (D. Utah April 28, 
1989), cited by the defendants is not inapposite. The public 
policy exception recognized in Berube was not at issue in 
Howcroft and Judge Anderson did not rule upon or even discuss it 
This Court rules that an action for wrongful 
termination based upon the public policy exception to the at-wil 
employment doctrine is an action founded upon tort rather than 
contract. The general rule in states recognizing such an 
exception characterize it as the tort of wrongful discharge.3 
1
 This exception protects an at-will employee from bein 
discharged for a reason or in a manner that contravenes soun 
principles of established and substantial policy. 
2
 Although there was no majority opinion in Berube, th 
Plurality opinion as well as Justice Zimmermann's concurrenc 
indicated willingness to recognize a public policy exception. 
3
 Arthur S. Leonard in his law review article, A New Commo 
Law of Employment Termination, North Carolina Law Review, Vol. 66 
631 (1988) reviews reported cases and says: In Order to prevent a 
employer from acting contrary to an important public policy, som 
state courts have recognized a tort of "wrongful discharge11 as a 
exception to the at will presumption, . • . Courts faced with 
public policy argument have searched for an existing label to plac 
on the resulting legal action. They have most frequently describe 
The clearest statement which appears to indicate the direction of 
Utah law on this matter is Justice Durham's plurality opinion in 
Berube: "Where an employee is discharged for a reason or in a 
manner that contravenes sound principles of established and 
substantial policy, the employee may typically bring a tort 
action against his employer" (emphasis added). Berube at 1042 
The rulings set forth in this memorandum decision and 
order will become the law of this case unless within 30 days 
after the date hereof a party or the parties jointly, on motion 
supported by memorandum and necessary documentation, request this 
court to certify the issues to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to 
Rule 41 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. If such a 
motion is filed, the court will set the matter for argument. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: January ^r\h 1990. 
'^$iu<A y\k\xt^^ 
J./TffOMAS 6REENE 
INCITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
COPIES TO: cnsl 1/24/90MP: 
David Havas, Esq. 
David R. Money, Esq. 
i t a s a t o r t of w r o n g f u l d i s c h a r g e . . . . " ( e m p h a s i s added) I d . a t 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH - NORTHERN DIVISION 
VERN L. PETERSON, 
Plaintiff, Civil No. 87-NC-12 
v. CERTIFICATION ORDE! 
BROWNING, a Utah Corporation, 
and DAVID W. RICH, 
Defendants. 
TO THE UTAH SUPREME COURT: 
This court hereby certifies the following question of 
law to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court, Rule 41: 
1. Does an action for termination of employment based 
upon the public policy exception to the employment-at-will 
doctrine, for violation of or refusal to violate federal, other 
state, or Utah law, sound in tort or contract? 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On October 30, 1987, plaintiff Vern Peterson filed a 
complaint against his former employer, Browning, and its 
personnel director, David W. Rich (hereafter "Defendants"), 
alleging three causes of action related to the termination of h 
employment with Browning: (i) violations of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act; (ii) breach of employment 
contract; and (iii) wrongful termination in violation of Utah 
public policy. In support of his public policy claim, plaintiff 
alleges, inter alia, that his employment was terminated because 
of his opposition to the falsification of inventory tax documents 
in violation of law, including the laws of the State of Missouri 
where he was employed by Browning at its Arnold, Missouri, plant; 
and because of his opposition to the falsification of customs 
documents in violation of federal customs laws in connection with 
his duties as customs officer for Browning. 
Plaintiff's public policy claim was dismissed by this 
court on August 16, 1989 pursuant to a motion filed by Defendants 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In light of the 
Utah Supreme Court's ruling in Berube v. Fashion Center. 777 P.2d 
1033 (Utah 1989) , plaintiff moved for restoration of the public 
policy cause of action, which motion was granted by this court 
after extensive briefing and oral argument. Defendants then 
filed a motion for certification of the issue for interlocutory 
appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals which was denied. 
The actions of this court in reinstating the public policy cause 
of action and denying the request for an interlocutory appeal to 
the Court of Appeals are reflected in an Order dated January 23, 
1990, attached hereto. 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CERTIFIED QUESTION 
The question certified to the Utah Supreme Court 
presents an issue of substance and controlling law in the pendi 
federal case. Plaintiff claims to have been discharged because 
of his refusal to violate federal and state law in violation of 
Utah public policy. This claim has to do with alleged refusal 
violate federal and foreign state law (Missouri), and possibly 
Utah law as well, as implicating Utah public policy. This clai 
enlarges this action from a contract and ERISA case that focuse 
on a discrete set of facts to such things as inquiry into 
Browning's customs and tax practices. Whether the claim sounds 
in contract or tort is important because the public policy clai 
is the only cause of action for which plaintiff seeks punitive 
damages. 
This action, like many others brought in federal cour 
involves a wrongful termination claim under Utah law which is 
pendent to the basic federal jurisdictional claims. We are awa 
that the plurality opinion in Berube sets forth an explanation 
regarding the public policy exception to the employment-at-will 
doctrine. This court would be greatly aided by instructions fr 
the Utah Supreme Court as to whether the public policy exceptio 
for violation of or refusal to violate law embraces federal and 
foreign state law, and whether it sounds in tort or contract. 
Based on the foregoing, the above referenced issue is 
certified to the Utah Supreme Court for consideration. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: August "Q/2- , 1990, 
ljJNylTED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
COPIES TO: 
mr 
United States District Court 
for the 
District of Utah 
August 24, 1990 
* * MAILING CERTIFICATE OF CLERK * * 
Re: l:87-cv-00121 
True and correct copies of the attached were mailed by the clerk to t 
following: 
David B Havas, Esq. 
2 6 04 Madison Avenue 
Ogden,, UT 84401 
David R Money, Esq. 
170 South Main Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City,, UT 84101 
DAVID BERT HAVAS (1424) and 
MICHELLE E. HEWARD (5084) of 
DAVID BERT HAVAS AND ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2604 Madison Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801)399-9636 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, NORTHERN DIVISION 
VERN L. PETERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BROWNING, a Utah corporation, 
and DAVID W. RICH, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 87-NC-121G 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
SS 
COUNTY OF WEBER) 
VERN L. PETERSON, being first duly sworn upon his oath 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. He is the Plaintiff in the above captioned case. 
2. In 1982 he was informed by Defendant Browning that 
he would be relocated to the Browning, Arnold, Missouri Plant and 
became the General Manager of that facility. 
3. As part of the agreement to move he and Defend 
Browning entered into a written employment contract dated 7/1/82, 
entitled "Company Relocation Procedure and Agreement with Vern 
Peterson in regard to his Transfer to the Arngld, Missouri 
Plant", a copy of which is attached to Defendants1 Statement of 
Points and Authorities in Support of their Motion for Summary 
Judgment or, In the Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment. 
PETERSON v. BROWNING AND RICH Civil No. 87-NC-121 
Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
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4. In 1982 Plaintiff moved himself and his wife t 
Arnold, Missouri, under the terms of the employment contract. 
5. Plaintiff entered into the employment contrac 
believing that the employment contract provided for a period o 
employment of six years. 
6. Plaintiff negotiated a six year contract o 
employment in order, amongst others, to complete enough years o 
service so as to allow him to retire with an adequate retiremen 
program. Plaintiff made this fact known to Defendant Browning a 
the time he agreed to his reassignment to Arnold, Missouri. 
7. Plaintiff worked for Browning at Arnold from 198 
until October, 1984 when he had several conversations with Davi 
Rich and Don Gobel which ultimately led to Plaintiff1 
termination from Browning. 
8. From October 18, 1984, through October 30, 1984 
Plaintiff taped eight telephone conversations held with Davi 
Rich and/or Don Gobel. Transcripts of those telephon 
conversations are attached to this document and marked as Exhibi 
A-l through A-8. 
9. Affiant has read the transcripts attached heret 
and to the best of his knowledge they are true and correc 
transcriptions of the telephone conversations above referred to. 
10. In the first telephone conversation Mr. Ric 
refers to a "moccasin telegraph" as causing a build up of ba 
feelings directed at Plaintiff by Ron Mosier. Plaintiff wa 
.^^x^wr. v. DKuwfiiNb AND RICH Civil No. 87-NC-121G 
Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
-3-
concerned over the influence that Mosier had over Don Gobel, the 
president of the company, and whether Gobel would rely upon 
Hosier's comments. 
11. Mr. Rich indicated to Affiant that if Browning was 
going to get rid of Plaintiff, that "Early retirement is the way 
out," and that in "reading between the lines... this is the 
beginning of the end rather than just an incident." Rich went on 
to state that Plaintiff was in "a no-win situation back there [in 
Arnold] as well as a no win situation here." 
12. Mr. Rich described Plaintiff's position as being 
"in a box", created by animosity directed at him by Mosier and 
others over the years. The situation, or box, was exacerbated by 
Mosier being Gobel's best friend. 
13. Mr. Rich indicated that he saw the same type of 
trap being formed for Plaintiff that had led to the termination 
of two former Browning employees: Jim Butts and Peter Wilson. 
Rich had a "gut reaction something like that [v/as] about to 
happen." That early retirement was the best way out. 
14. Plaintiff indicated to Rich that "you and I both 
know... I'm being forced out." To which Mr. Rich replied "Yeh. 
That's right." 
15. Plaintiff believed that he was being forced out of 
his position with Browning and had no option but to accept the 
early retirement offer. 
16. After discussing facets of the burden the 
PETERSON v. BROWNING AND RICH Civil No. 87-NC 
Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
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retirement would place'on Plaintiff, he stated "if you feel t 
if I interpret from you correctly, ...I don't stand a praye 
make the offer. I'm just not going to fight it." Which 
confirmed by Rich, "That's what I read between the lin 
17. Rich indicated that an offer should be made be 
closed doors for Plaintiff to retire, and that Plaintiff sh 
accept it. Plaintiff made it clear that he was being t 
advantage of and was on the "short end of the stick". "[i 
time it is a fair fight, I'm willing to roll up my sleeves 
take a shot at it, but when I'm outnumbered I feel like 
Custer at Little Big Horn." 
18. The following day, Plaintiff called Mr. Rich wh 
it was confirmed that Mr. Gobel had made up his mind to termin 
Plaintiff, and that the "moccasin telegraph" had brought thi 
to fruition. That the decision had been made for several we 
or months. 
19. After Plaintiff returned from a vacation he ag 
contacted Mr. Richf who indicated that the retirement pack* 
Browning was offering was almost put together. (Trans. 5, p. 
20. Mr. Rich indicated that Plaintiff did not have 
take the retirement, but then added that from what he could "s 
reading between the lines, and what [he'd] heard and what Got 
said, yes, offer it to him because he thinks it is the best thi 
too." The conversation continued with Mr. Rich acknowledgi 
that the "handwriting" already indicated he would be terminate 
PETERSON v. BROWNING AND RICH Civil No. 87-NC-121G 
Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants* 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
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and that Gobel indicated Plaintiff was in a no-win situation. 
(Trans. 5, p. 2). 
21. In the next phone conversation, after discussing 
the offer Browning was making to Plaintiff, Plaintiff asked if he 
would get fired if he refused to accept. Mr. Rich replied, 
"Well, I would not say that's the immediate alternative. No, but 
I read between the lines, I mean he [Gobel] has not said that 
directly to me, well, if he doesn't take it, then we'll terminate 
him. But that's what I read between the lines." (Trans. 6, pp. 
11-12) . 
22. The final telephone conversation Plaintiff had 
with Browning management which he taped was initially with Don 
Gobel, Dave Rich was conferenced into the telephone conversation 
after a period of time. 
23. Plaintiff had no plans for early retirement and 
was not ready to retire at the time that Defendants indicated he 
should accept early retirement or be fired. 
24. Plaintiff recalls being told that the writing was 
on the wall, that if he challenged the early retirement he would 
be opening a can of worms, and that it would only be a matter of 
months before he was terminated if he failed to accept the early 
retirement offer. 
25. Plaintiff expressed his concerns to Gobel that he 
didn't have a choice but to accept early retirement, that 
Plaintiff v/as being forced out and he didn't know why, and that 
PETERSON v. BROWNING AND RICH Civil No. 87-NC-l 
Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
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as he understood his options, he would be fired 
accept early retirement. 
26. Gobel's only criticism which were 
Plaintiff was that his meetings were too long and 
pontificate. 
27. Plaintiff was sent to Arnold, Missouri, in t 
midst of a "cesspool of morale" problems which culminated in a 
week strike, the first strike the company ever had. Got 
admitted he did not expect to receive glowing reports fr 
personnel in light of the Company problems in which Plaintiff w 
thrust. 
28. Plaintiff expressed his concern again that he d 
not have a choice but to take early retirement. He was no 
however, in a financial position to take early retiremen 
29. After a lengthy discussion in which Plaintiff w 
advised of various rumors and bad feelings which had been level< 
against him, Mr. Peterson expressed surprise that he had not be< 
confronted with the allegations before so that he would have h< 
an opportunity to respond and/or correct the problems if th< 
existed. 
30. After analogizing the swell of animosity towai 
Mr. Peterson to that which arose against former Secretary of tt 
Interior James Watt, Mr. Rich indicated "The momentum is so muc 
against you, like President Reagan said, no I don't want to fir 
you but the best alternative for you is early retirement. 
if he did 
relayed 
he tended 
PETERSON v. BROWNING AND RICH Civil No. 87-NC-121G 
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Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
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31. Mr. Gobel indicated that the retirement they were 
offering Plaintiff was a "one-time deal" that had never been 
offered in the past and which he doubted would be offered in the 
future. Plaintiff then replied that he had no choice, he would 
have to take it. 
32. After Plaintiff indicated he didn't believe it was 
fair but that he had no choice but to take early retirement, Mr. 
Gobel indicated he could essentially try to get to the bottom of 
the rumors and get everything on the table. He thought, however 
that would only make matters worse and not accomplish anything. 
He didn't see another alternative for Plaintiff. 
33. Plaintiff believes, and therefore states, that 
Mr. Gobelfs statement that he could essentially try to get to the 
bottom of the rumors and get everything on the table, was 
facetious in light of Mr. Gobel's prior attitude and statements, 
and further in light of his statement that it would not 
accomplish anything and he saw no other alternative but 
retirement for Plaintiff. 
34. The information which was relayed to Plaintiff by 
Mr. Rich and Mr. Gobel regarding the animosity against him the 
backstabbing, rumors, lack of support and general attitude 
against him came as a surprise to Plaintiff since up until that 
time he was unaware of these circumstances. Plaintiff was made 
to feel and believed that these circumstances presented an 
intolerable working condition for him and he believed it was 
PETERSON v. BROWNING AND RICH Civil No. 87-NC-121 
Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
-8-
impossible for him to continue to work for Defendant Brownin 
under these conditions. 
35. Plaintiff had not been advised by either Mr. Ric 
or Mr. Gobel of the general attitude towards him and the genera 
conditions affecting Plaintiff, notwithstanding the fact tha 
Plaintiff had a six year employment contract with Defendan 
Browning of which Mr. Rich and Gobel were aware. 
36. Plaintiff believed that Don Gobel, perhaps th 
Board of Directors or anyone acting with authority from the 
would have authority to terminate him. Specifically, Plaintif 
believed that Mr. Rich, as personnel manager, if acting wit 
authority from Don Gobel, would have the authority to terminat 
Plaintiff. 
37. When requested by Brov/ning to provide his wifef 
signature on a single life annuity agreement, Plaintiff would nc 
do so because that was not part of the early retirement packac 
offered to him in October, 1984. 
38. Plaintiff believed, based upon the conversatior 
he had with David Rich and Don Gobel, that he would be terminate 
if he did not accept the early retirement package offered I 
Browning. 
39. Prior to his telephone conversation with Davi 
Rich and Don Gobel which is reflected in transcript 8 attach* 
hereto, Plaintiff believed he was functioning well in his job, 
PETERSON v. BROWNING AND RICH 
Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
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Civil No. 87-NC-121G 
and that no major problems with regard to his job performance 
existed. 
Further, Affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this .^G7'^day of April, 1989. 
L/&U* 
rERSON VERN L. PET I 
P l a i n t i f f / A f f i a n t 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF WEBER) 
I, VERN L. PETERSON, being first duly sworn, say that I 
have read the foregoing Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and that the information set forth in the foregoing 
Affidavit is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and 
belief and for those items which are based upon belief, I believe 
them to be true. 
VERN L. PETERSON 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this - J ? ^ d a v of 
April, 1989, by Vern L. Pe^ euMyyi. 
Y/\XU<^I A y , i,/w ( ; (•• V # < ? /
 %. ^  . 
#i—/ \—ffipARY PUBLIC; 
3 KATHY GRAHAM Rfesiding/ a t : C ' M ^ ' , ( ' ' 
| r — \ / ~ ~ W Commission E x p i r e s : /~)/^/*/ \^vT -2T, 
n o 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that T caused to be hand delivered 
true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Affidavit i 
Support of Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants 
Motion for Summary Judgment to David R. Money and Sharon E 
Sonnenreich of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, Attorneys fo 
Defendants, 1500 First Interstate Plaza, 170 South Main Street 
J/J 
Salt Lr1"? City, Utah 84111, on this Q^ day of April, 1989 
I S / /U/E/f 
The following states have expressly or impliedly 
recognized a wrongful termination or retaliatory discharge claim 
as a result of public policy violations, based in tort: 
ARIZONA, Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital, 710 P.2d 
1025, 103*6 ( 1985) (termination for refusal to commit act which 
might constitute indecent exposure), Wagner v. City of Globe, 722 
P.2d 250 (1986) (good discussion re recognizing exceptions to at-
will rule); 
CALIFORNIA, Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1331 
(1980); 
COLORADO, Cronk v. Intermountain Rural Electric Assn, 765 P.2d 
619, 622 (Ct.App. 1988) (employee discharged for exercising a 
specifically enacted right or duty), Winther v. DEC 
International, Inc., 625 F.Supp 100, 104 (D.ColcT 1985) (applying 
Colorado law, cause of action is a tort); 
CONNECTICUT, Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 
385, 388-89 (1980) (termination for insisting employer comply 
with food and drug laws); 
HAWAII, Parnar v. American Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 631 (1982) 
(fired because testimony before federal grand jury might be 
damaging to employer); 
ILLINOIS, Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 877 
(1981) (termination for giving information to police in criminal 
investigation); 
INDIANA, Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 
(1973) (termination for filing worker's compensation claim), 
Scott v. Union Tank Car, 402 N.E.2d 992 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) 
(wrongful discharge action is a tort); 
IOWA, Springer v. Weeks & Leo Co., Inc., 429 N.W.2d 558, 560 
(1988) (termination for filing worker's compensation claim); 
KANSAS, Murphy v. City of Topeka, 630 P.2d 186, 193 (Kan. App. 
1981) (retaliatory discharge); 
KENTUCKY, Firestone Textile Co. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730, 733 
(1984) (violation of fundamental and well defined public policy); 
Addendum VII 
MARYLAND, Kern v. South Baltimore General Hospital, 504 A.2d 1154 
(Ct.App. 1986) (recognizes public policy based cause of action, 
but not in facts of this case), Alder v. American Standard Corp., 
538 F.Supp. 572, 579 6c 580 (D.Md. 1982) (good discussion re 
federal law as source of public policy); 
MICHIGAN, Goins v. Ford Motor Co., 347 N.W.2d 184, 191 (Ct. App. 
1983) (termination for filing worker's compensation claim against 
employer) although a separate panel of the Court of Appeals ruled 
in a 1988 case that termination in retaliation for filing a 
worker's compensation claim sounds in contract, not tort. See 
Lopas v. L & L Shop-Rite, Inc., 430 N.W.2d 757 (1988); 
MINNESOTA, Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 396 N.W.2d 588, 
592 (Ct.App"! 1986) (violation of federal law basis for public 
policy); 
MISSOURI, Boyle v. Vista Eyeware, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 878 
(Ct.App. 1985) (federal law FDA regulations were basis for public 
policy); 
MONTANA, Nye v. Dept. of Livestock, 638 P.2d 498, 502 (1982) (But 
1987 legislation requires employer to discharge only for good 
cause and not in retaliation for refusing to do an act violative 
of public policy or in violation of personnel policy); 
NEVADA, Hanson v. Harrah's, 675 P.2d 394, 396 (1984) 
(termination for filing worker's compensation claim); 
NEW HAMPSHIRE, Cloutier v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 436 
A.2d 1140, 1143^ 1146 (1981) (refers to prior cases as 
establishing tort based cause of action for violation of public 
policy); 
NEW JERSEY, Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 
512 (1980) see also Cerracchio v. Alden Leeds, Inc., 538 A.2d 
1292 (1988) (tort and contract remedies available); " 
NEW MEXICO, Vigil v. Arzola, 699 P.2d 613, 619 (Ct.App. 1983) 
(revised on other grounds), see also Chavez v. Manville Products 
Corp., 777 P.2d 371 (1989) (Court of Appeals may have been overly 
cautious in initial recognition of cause of action for 
retaliatory discharge); 
NORTH CAROLINA, Sides v. Duke Hospital, 328 S.E.2d 818, 830 (App. 
1985), rev, denied, 333 S.E.2d 490 (1985) (terminated for refusal 
to testify untruthfully in Court), see also Coman v. Thomas Mfg. 
Co., 381 S.E.2d 445 (1989) (Supreme Ct. upholds Sides reasoning); 
NORTH DAKOTA, Krein v. Morian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793, 
795 (1987) (termination for filing worker's compensation claim); 
OKLAHOMA, Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2D 24, 28 (1989) (violation 
of public policy set in constitution, statutes or case law gives 
rise to tort); 
OREGON, Delaney v. Taco Time Int'l, Inc., 681 P.2d 114, 116 
(1984) (terminated for refusal to sign potentially defamatory 
statement)? 
PENNSYLVANIA, Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119 
(1978) (terminated for jury duty), Veno v. Meredith, 515 A.2d 
571, 577 (1986) (public policy violation gives rise to a tort); 
RHODE ISLAND, Cummins v. EG & G Sealol, Inc., 690 F.Supp 134 
(D.R.I. 1988) (Concludes Rhode Island would recognize public 
policy based cause of action citing Volino v. General Dynamics, 
539 A.2d 531 (1988)); 
SO. CAROLINA, Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 337 
S.E.2d 213, 216 (1985) (terminated for honoring subpoena to grand 
jury investigation); 
TENNESSEE, Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441, 444-45 
(1984); 
TEXAS, Sabine v. Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 
(1985) (discharged for refusing to perform illegal act), 
McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69, (1989) (Court 
acknowledges damages for mental anguish and punitive damages); 
VIRGINIA, Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 331 S.E.2d 797, 801 
(1985), Haigh v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of America, 676 F.Supp 
1332 (E.D. Va. 1987) (discusses and applies Va. law)? 
WASHINGTON, Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1089 
(1984) (termination for complying with law); 
WEST VIRGINIA, Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 289 S.E.2d 692, 701 
(1982) (refusal to violate consumer protection laws); 
WYOMING, Griess v. Consolidated Freightways, 776 P.2d 752, 754 
(1989) (terminated for filing worker's compensation claim). 
Of those states recognizing a public policy exception, 
the following states provide contract remedies for such cause of 
action: 
ALASKA, Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123 
(1989) (violations ol public policy considered breaches of 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, implies 
contractual remedies); 
ARKANSAS, Sterling Drug, Inc v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380 (1988), 
reh den. 747 S.W.2d 579 (1988) (public policy violations 
predicated on breach of implied provision not to discharge for an 
act done in public interest); 
MICHIGAN, Lopas v. L & L Shop Rite, Inc., 430 N.W.2d 757 (1988) 
(termination for filing a worker's compensation claim sounds in 
contract). 
WISCONSIN, Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983). 
In the following states Plaintiff has been unable to 
ascertain whether the recognized public policy based cause of 
action sounds in tort or contract: 
IDAHO, Staggier v. Idaho Falls Consolidated Hospitals, Inc., 715 
P.2d 1019 (Ct.App. 1986); 
MASSACHUSETTS, Hobson v. McLean Hospital Corp. 522 N.E.2d 975, 
978-979 ftnt. 3 (Sup.Jud.Ct. 1988), DeRose v. Putnam Mgmt. Co., 
496 N.E.2d 428 (1986) (good discussion re measure of damages tort 
no holding); 
NEBRASKA, Ambroz v. Cornhuskers Square, Ltd., 416 N.W.2d 510 
(1987), Schriner v. Meginnis Ford Co., 421 N.W.2d 755 (1988); 
VERMONT, Payne v. Rozendaal, 520 A.2d 586, 589 (1986); 
The following states have not adopted a public policy 
exception to at-will rule: 
ALABAMA, Reich v. Holiday Inn, 454 S.2d 982 (1984) (case did not 
Present justification to modify at-will rule), but see Scholtes 
v. Signal Delivery Service, Inc., 548 F.Supp. 487 (W.D.Arlr: 1982) 
(held Arkansas would recognize exception to at-will rule); 
DELAWARE; 
FLORIDA, Smith v. Piezo Technology & Professional Administrators, 
42 7 S.2d 182 (1983) (but statutes already prohibit employer 
retaliation for voting, jury service, whistle blowing and filing 
worker's compensation claims); 
GEORGIA; 
LOUISIANA, Gil v. Metal Service Corp., 412 S.2d 706 (Ct.App. 
1982); 
MAINE; 
MISSISSIPPI, Laws v. Aetna Finance Co., 667 F.Supp. 342, 348 
(D.N. Miss. 1987) (Mississippi would adopt public policy 
exception to at-will rule); 
NEW YORK, Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86 
(N.Y.App. 1983); 
OHIO, Phung v. Waste Management, Inc., 491 N.E. 2d 1114 (1986) 
(refuses to recognize exception on these facts but see dissent 
analysis of tort vs. contract issue); 
SOUTH DAKOTA, Abrogated employment at-will by statute; 
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1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 16, 1989, 2:00 P.t 
2 * * * 
3 THE COURT: All right. On the motion for reinstates 
4 I'm going to grant that motion. 
5 The third cause of action, I think we are drivei 
6 by a lot of facts here. I'm satisfied that there is a 
7 direction in Utah law which would embrace, at least, this 
8 kind of a public policy. So Defendant's motion for summa 
9 judgment on the third cause of action is denied. 
10 Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, remsta 
11 ment is granted. 
12 The Defendant's motion for summary judgment in 
13 general is denied, and its motion as to the first: cause o 
14 action and second cause of action is denied. I believe 
15 there are material issues of faot that need to be explore 
16 and developed. I also consider the express contract to t 
17 ambiguous on the issue of the meaning of the six years. 
18 am inclined to agree with Mr. Money that the weight of tt 
19 evidence may lean toward an explanation of that term as 
20 related only to relocation, but I'm also convinced that i 
21 are other plausible explanations. In any event, one of 
22 those could be the position that's* been taken here relat 
23 to a term of art. 
24 The Defendant's motion to strike Plaintiff's 
25 motion to compel is granted with this understanding: I 
1 think the parties should get together and talk about this 
2 and see what's left, and nov; that we've got a ruling on the 
3 third cause of action. Then in the spirit of getting things 
4 together, you've got to sit down and listen to the original 
5 tapes and quit trying to compare a reconstruction of a copy 
6 of the original tape with a transcript in the possession of 
7 Mr. Havas from the original tape. I do think that the 
8 reconstructed transcript is, at least, in part, a work 
9 product. So do that and see where you are with respect to 
10 the matter of bonus calculations and things of that nature, 
n whether the documents need to be produced or ma^be they 
12 need to be excised so as to preserve identity, preserve 
13 confidentiality. I would think counsel could work out 
14 something in that regard. It isn't an answer to say they 
15 can go with the percentages as well as they could with 
16 dollar amounts because they have a right to do it the way 
17 they want to do it. But I think that's all to be tempered 
18 by the fact that there may well be confidential information 
19 here and things that need to be protected, and if there is 
20 something that is sought that counsel believes to be in the 
21 I category of privilege, work product or confidential informa-
22 | tion that ought to be produced, you ought to create a 
23 | privilege log and we ought to talk about a new motion to 
24 | compel, if that's necessary. 
25 | The motion to compel the answer is denied. 
7 
1 The motion to strike is granted with the mstr 
2 tifans that counsel get together and see what they can dc 
2 work out these discovery matters. 
4 I suppose the motion with respect to the custo 
5 and tax laws, except as to the motion in limine relative 
g it, is subsumed by these rulings. 
As to the motion to strike Plaintiff's designa 
8 I of expert witness, I'm going to permit that expert witne 
9 to be deposed and to stand as an expert witness. 
I would like to know what remains. I would ra 
not open discovery generally, but it looks to me like we 
need to have a period of time for discovery as to the ma 
raised in the third cause of action. We need to have an 
opportunity for discovery with respect to this designate 
expert. 
Is there anything else as to which discovery w 
be required by either side? 
MR. MONEY: May I take it that our renewed motion f 
ERISA pre-emption is denied as well? 
TRE COURT: Yes, it is. 
MR. HAVAS: I believe as far as discovery, Your Hon 
discovery has been reserved, and, then, the expert and t 
third cause of action is all that I can see. 
MR.* MONEY: That's correct, Your HonQr. 
THE COURT: As to the third cause of action and the 
10 
11 
12 
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14 
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16 
17 
IS 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
1 expert, Chris Lewis, is that --
2 | MR. HAVAS: No. And there is a couple -- a number of 
3 depositions of stipulation we have reserved pending ruling 
4 here, I believe three. 
5 THE COURT: I think maybe what you ought to do is 
6 to — let's have two orders, one reflecting the rulings of 
7 the Court on the pending motions, and another as an amended 
8 scheduling order that will define the discovery that you 
9 both have agreed may now be conducted. If you want to just 
10 outright agree between you that it's to be extended 
11 generally, that's fine. But I'm not suggesting that you do 
12 that. The order of the Court is that it not be open 
13 generally but that it go for the third cause of action and 
14 this expert witness, and anything th^t you have already 
15 agreed upon, that may be done. Nov;, if you want to make it 
16 broader than that, put it in the ord&r. If you want to 
17 leave it at that, let's have an understanding what will be 
18 done. 
19 How much time do you want %o complete that? 
20 MR. HAVAS: Complete discovery dr complete the order? 
21 THE COURT: Well, with respect to completing the order, 
22 I'll give you until 5:30. 
23 MR. HAVAS: That's generous of the Court. 
24 J THE COURT: I was really thinkirta of completing 
25 I discovery. What do you need? Do you need more than 30 days? 
1 MR. HAVAS: I believe we do. 
2 MR. MONEY: We would agree with that. 
3 MR. HAVAS: I would think three months is probably 
4 time — 
5 MR. MONEY: I would agree with that as well, Your 
6 Honor. We're not as contentious as we seem with each oth 
7 THE COURT: Do you want to take until the first of 
8 December to complete discovery? 
9 MR. HAVAS: I think we might be able to get it finis 
10 before then, but that will be a good time. 
11 THE COURT: Why don't we do that. If there's -- if y 
12 canft work it out by your sitting down and talking on the 
13 discovery matters, we'll need to have to, perhaps, talk 
14 again about that. But we'11 have a further status and 
15 scheduling conference on December the 18th at 11:30. Now 
16 at that time, we'll be in a position, I would presume, to 
17 set a pre-trial and move this case into a trial posture. 
18 in your amended scheduling order, I think you 
19 ought to define what the main discovery is to be. You ca 
20 prepare that, Mr. Money, and have Mr. Havas sign off on i 
21 I'll ask Mr. Havas to prepare the general order 
22 with respect to the rulings of the Court and have that 
23 submitted to Mr. Money for his approval as to form. I th 
24 that order you prepare, Mr. Havas, ought to make note of 
25 I a couple of reserved things that we haven't ruled on. I 
1 suppose there are notions in limine 
2 MR. HAVAS: Very well, Your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: Is there anything further now? 
4 MR. MONEY: No, not from us, Your Honor. 
5 MR. HAVAS: Nothing further. Thank you. 
6 THE COURT: Thank you. 
7 All right. We're in recess. 
8 (Whereupon, the matter was concluded.) 
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